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Abstract
People continue to live in many big American cities, because in those cities
housing costs less than new construction.  While cities may lose their productive
edge, their houses remain and population falls only when housing depreciates.
This paper presents a simple durable housing model of urban decline with several
implications which document:  (1) urban growth rates are leptokurtotic— cities
grow more quickly than they decline, (2) city growth rates are highly persistent,
especially amount declining cities, (3) positive shocks increase population more
than they increase housing prices, (4) negative shocks decrease housing prices
more than they decrease population, (5) the relationship between changes in
housing prices and changes in population is strongly concave, and (7) declining
cities attract individuals with low levels of human capital.
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I.  Introduction
In eight of the fifteen largest cities in the U.S. in 1950— Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland,
Detroit, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.— population has
declined in every subsequent decade.  Another three of these top fifteen also have smaller
populations now than in 1950.  All of these cities are still large, but many have lost more
than one-third of their populations.  With decline has come poverty and social distress:
across cities, the correlation between the poverty rate in 1989 and population growth in
the 1980s was -40 percent.  While firms try to downsize by firing their least skilled
workers, cities appear to downsize by losing their most skilled residents.
Many forces contributed to the decline of these, primarily rustbelt, cities.  Improvements
in transportation technology eliminated the advantages that these cities once had as ports.
As lower transport costs made firms footloose, people and firms fled the harsh climates
of the Northeast and Midwest.  Manufacturing has declined and de-urbanized.  In 1963,
Detroit had 338,000 manufacturing jobs, and by 1992, the Motor City had only 62,000
manufacturing jobs.  Local policies often exacerbated these declines as some city
officials made redistribution a higher priority than keeping businesses.  National policies
also may have favored sprawl and the sunbelt.  While once the rustbelt cities had high
wages—reflecting their productivity—now they are generally mired in poverty (e.g.
Detroit’s median income is 62 percent of the national average), reflecting the fact that
they no longer have a productive edge.
Indeed, the key question about these declining cities is not “why aren’t they growing?”
The key question is “why are they still there are at all?”  Quickly growing cities rise at
dizzying rates—Las Vegas has grown by more than 50 percent in four out of the last five
decades.  Why is it that declining cities collapse so slowly?  The lowest growth rate in the
1990s among the set of consistently declining cities was -12.5 percent (St. Louis).  And
why, when these cities decline, do they lose their most skilled workers?3
Agglomeration models provide an explanation for why people stay in cities long after
those places have lost their comparative advantages.  Following Krugman (1991),
agglomeration theorists argue that if a critical mass of firms assembles in one place, then
workers will stay there because they are either able to earn higher wages, or buy cheaper
manufactured goods, or face less unemployment risk.  However, these theories tell us
little about the continuing existence of Detroit and many other declining cities, as these
places have low wages and high unemployment.  In addition, American Chamber of
Commerce price data tells us that non-housing goods are not materially cheaper in
declining cities.
1
This paper argues that people still live in the blighted cities of America’s rustbelt for a far
more prosaic reason than agglomeration economies.  These places have houses, and
houses are very durable.  When cities decline, housing prices fall and people continue to
live in the houses.  To a first approximation, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the number of homes in a city and the number of people in that city.  It takes
decades, if not centuries, for the housing in cities to disappear, and while the houses
remain, the cities remain, attracting residents with homes that cost a fraction of new
construction costs.  In 1990, over 60 percent of all owned, single unit residences in
Philadelphia were priced below the cost of new construction, and 30 percent of all homes
in the city were valued at no more than 70 percent of construction costs.  In Detroit, 80
percent of the owner-occupied single family housing was valued at least 30 percent
below construction costs in 1990.
Figure 1 illustrates our framework.   The supply of housing is characterized by a kinked
supply curve which is highly elastic with respect to positive shocks and almost
completely inelastic with respect to negative shocks in the medium run.  The durability of
housing is such that it takes decades for a house to become economically unviable and to
                                                          
1 See No. 771—Cost of Living Index—Selected Metropolitan Areas, Fourth Quarter 1999 in the Statistical
Abstract of the United States 2000 for more detail.  The American Chamber of Commerce computes the
cost of a mid-management standard of living in a number of participating metropolitan areas (not cities).
While not all of the shrinking cities mentioned above are not tracked in these data, among those which are,
purchasing the targeted standard of living costs more than the average in the nation.  Thus, there are no
meaningful savings found in terms of non-housing goods expenses.4
disappear from the market.  A negative demand shock, like that illustrated in Figure 1,
leads to a large fall in price, but little change in the stock of housing—and, therefore, in
population.  In growing places, positive demand shocks result primarily in more units
with little increase in price.
We incorporate this feature of supply, namely that there is an asymmetry between
positive and negative shocks, into a dynamic version of the Alonso-Mills-Muth urban
model.  In our framework, housing depreciates stochastically and a fixed number of
people live in each house.  Houses that decay are rebuilt if and only if the value of the
unit (including its land value) exceeds its resale price.  Thus, city populations decline
only when the prices of some of their homes fall below the cost of new construction.  If
the productivity of a city falls, housing prices will drop immediately as a classic
compensating variation for lower wages (see Rosen (1979)), but housing itself decays
slowly.  Population declines only gradually as the houses disintegrate.
Our simple urban model with durable housing can explain several key features of urban
dynamics.  First, it can explain some of the remarkable persistence of urban growth rates,
especially among declining cities.  Almost nine out of ten cities that declined in the 1990s
also declined in the 1980s.  Nearly eight of ten cities that declined in the 1930s also lost
population between 1940 and 1990.  Because housing decay is slow, it takes decades for
the city housing stock to adjust to a new steady state.
The model also predicts leptokurtotic growth rates.  If shocks to urban productivity (or
city amenities) are symmetric, then cities will grow more quickly than they decline when
housing is durable.  As Figure 1 suggests, new construction is readily forthcoming when
prices are above construction costs, but units and population disappear only slowly over
time.  The skewness of city growth rates is ubiquitous throughout the 20
th century.
The model also predicts an asymmetric response to positive and negative “exogenous”
shocks to cities.  Negative shocks will have only a small impact on urban growth,
because housing depreciates slowly.  Positive shocks will have a large effect, because5
housing can be built relatively quickly (at least over the decade-long periods we
examine).  Just as the durable housing view of cities predicts a convexity in the
relationship between population growth and exogenous shocks, it predicts concavity in
the relationship between price changes and exogenous shocks.  Negative shocks impact
prices significantly, but positive shocks will show up more in new housing, thereby
vitiating some of the increase in prices.  Both asymmetries generally are borne out in
regression analysis using data on shocks to amenities (weather) and productivity (local
labor demand as represented by manufacturing employment).
Next, housing durability implies that the distribution of house prices is an excellent
predictor of future population growth—and not merely because high house prices reflect
future price growth.  Population growth is quite rare in cities with large numbers of
homes valued below the cost of new construction.  We do not interpret this as a causal
connection, but claim that this strong correlation illustrates the role the housing market
plays in mediating growth.
The model also explains why declining cities disproportionately attract low human
capital residents.  As labor demand falls in declining cities, high and low skilled workers
lose wages roughly in proportion to their base income.   However, the benefits from
lower housing prices help the poor more than the rich, because the elasticity of demand
for housing structure is far less than one (Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2000).
2  As such
a drop in the price of housing attracts the poor relatively more than it attracts the rich.   If
housing prices fall to keep a median resident indifferent between a declining city and the
rest of America, then a low income resident will strictly prefer the city, and a high
income resident will prefer to leave.  Those outside the labor force will be particularly
attracted to cheap, declining places.  For them, there is no wage loss associated with a
declining city and they get their housing cheaply.  This may help us understand the
correlation between urban social problems and declining urban population.
                                                          
2 Older estimates with higher income elasticities all look at total spending on housing.  The overwhelming
component of higher spending on houses by higher income individuals is higher spending on
neighborhood, not higher consumption of physical structure.6
The next section presents basic facts about housing and cities that will serve to justify the
assumptions of the model.  Section III presents the model.  Section IV looks at facts
about city growth.  Section V examines city composition and urban dynamics.  Section
VI investigates more seriously the role that housing costs might play in inducing
individuals to stay in declining cities.  Section VII concludes.
II.  Housing and City Growth—Introductory Facts
This section establishes three basic facts that underpin our bricks and mortar view of
urban dynamics.  First, we document the powerful connection between housing and
population.  This connection is critical for our argument that the housing stock
determines the size of a city.   Second, we establish that there are large portions of urban
America where housing costs are substantially below the cost of new construction (even
if land is free).  This fact justifies our emphasis on declining cities with prices below the
cost of new construction.  Third, we establish a connection between housing construction
and the share of the housing stock that costs less than the price of new construction.
The Connection between Housing Units and City Population
In principle, the connection between the number of homes and the number of people in a
city could be weak.  Declining cities could see large increases in the vacancy rate, and
cities might grow through increases in the number of people per unit.  But this is false.
The link between the housing stock and city population is extraordinarily tight.  Figure 2
shows the relationship between the logarithm of the number of housing units and the
logarithm of city population in 1990.
 3  The r-squared is 98.6 percent—the elasticity is
.996.  In 1980, the elasticity is 1.007 and the r-squared of the relationship is 99.0 percent.
In 1970, the elasticity is 1.017 and the r-squared in 99.0 percent.  Across cities, at any
given point in time, the link between the number of people and the number of homes is
almost perfect.
                                                          
3 All of the data in this section come from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 censuses.  We consider all cities with
more than 30,000 people in each decade for the levels regressions and all cities with more than 30,000
people in the initial time period for the change regressions.7
The relationship between changes in housing units and changes in population is more
important for our model.  Figure 3 shows this connection for the 1970s.  The elasticity
estimated is essentially one (1.007) and the r-squared is 91.0 percent.  The fit is less good
in the 1980s, as the elasticity from a regression of change in housing units on change in
population is only 0.82, and the r-squared is 81 percent.  Closer examination of the data
from that decade finds the mismatch between housing and population to be almost
entirely due to fast growing California cities in which housing growth did not keep up
with population growth.  Perhaps, this was because immigrants crowded into homes or
perhaps because of constraints on new construction.
4  If we exclude California cities, the
r-squared in the 1980’s rises to 87 percent and the estimated elasticity increases to 0.96.
Importantly, the mismatch between changes in population and changes in housing units
occurs almost exclusively in rapidly growing cities.  The connection between people and
homes continues to be extremely tight in declining cities.
5
The Distribution of Housing Prices and Construction Costs
This paper is primarily concerned with cities that lie on the vertical part of the housing
supply curve in Figure 1.  For our durable housing model to explain the persistence of
Philadelphia or Detroit, it must be cheaper to live there than to build a comparable house
on the edges of the sunbelt, where land is essentially free.  Thus, we compare the
distribution of the value of the housing stock with the cost of new construction, and
compute the distribution of houses priced above and below construction costs for 123
cities in 1980 and 93 cities in 1990.
                                                          
4 We suspect that building constraints are a more important factor, as immigrant inflows are also quite large
in very fast growing cities in Arizona, Florida, and Texas.  Growth in units outpaces growth in population
in cities in those states, leading us to believe restrictions on development are relevant.  However, that is a
separate issue for future research.
5 An important reason the relationship between growth in units and growth in population still is so tight is
that, while vacancy rates are higher in declining cities, they are only slightly more so.  For example, in
1990 the vacancy rate was 7.8 percent among cities that grew in the 1980s, and 9.3 percent among cities
that declined in population.  If California cities are excluded, the mean vacancy rate among growing cities
is 8.5 percent, further narrowing the difference in vacancies between declining and expanding cities.8
Housing unit values are obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) maintained by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota
and from the American Housing Survey (AHS).  The IPUMS and AHS series contain
micro data on individuals and housing units, with self-reported values.  In each, we focus
exclusively on observations of single unit residences that are owner occupied in order to
better facilitate a comparison with construction costs.  We use construction cost data from
the R.S. Means Company (hereafter, the Means data).
 6   This firm computes construction
costs per square foot of living area for single family homes in a wide variety of American
and Canadian cities.  The Means data on construction costs include material costs, labor
costs, and equipment costs for four different qualities of single unit residences.  No land
costs are included so their data are for the physical structure itself.
7
We adjust the data to account for the depreciation that occurs on older homes, to account
for general inflation when making comparisons across different years, to account for the
fact that research shows owners overestimate the value of their homes, and to account for
regional variation in the presence of key house attributes that have a major impact on
value.  The data appendix discusses these and other data construction issues in detail.
Tables in the appendix report summary statistics on the distribution of house value to
construction costs for each city in 1980 and 1990.  Figure 4 highlights the extensive
heterogeneity across cities in the share of single family housing that was priced below
construction costs in 1980.   Many cities in California (and Hawaii) have almost no
housing priced below the cost of new construction, while many of the older cities in the
                                                          
6 Two publications are particularly relevant for greater detail on the underlying data:  Residential Cost
Data, 19
th annual edition, (2000) and Square Foot Costs, 21
st annual edition (2000), both published by the
R.S. Means Company.
7 It is noteworthy that the Means data contain information on four qualities of homes—economy, average,
custom, and luxury.  The series are broken down further by the size of living area (ranging from 600ft
2 to
3200ft
2), the number of stories in the unit, and a few other differentiators.  We developed cost series for a
one story, economy house, with an unfinished basement, with the mean cost associated with four possible






2) size in terms of living area.  Generally, our choices reflect low to modest
construction costs.  This conservative strategy is appropriate given our purposes.  Because we are
particularly interested in accounting for why people continue to live in relatively unattractive areas, we
could easily bias the findings toward a ‘cheap housing’ explanation by choosing a high quality house for9
colder regions of the country (the Midwest especially), are filled with cheap housing.
These data alone should raise questions about urban models that suggest land generally is
worth a great deal.
Nationally, 41 percent of single unit housing in cities in 1980 are valued below the cost
of new construction.  In 1980, nearly 60 percent of all owned, single unit, attached and
detached residences in the central cities of the northeast and midwest were valued below
the cost of new construction.  One-third of the stock in these regions was worth no more
than 80 percent of construction costs.  Conversely, in the west only 5 percent of homes
were priced more than 20 percent below new construction costs, and nearly three-quarters
were valued in excess of 120 percent of construction costs.  These regional patterns
persist in 1990 despite a general rise in housing values.  By 1990, the midwest still had a
large amount of very cheap housing relative to construction costs; the west still had
plenty of land that is worth a great deal, and the south and northeast were somewhere in
between these two extremes.
8
Changes in Units and Housing Prices below Construction Costs
The third building block of our model is that existing cheap housing is a substitute for
new construction.  For this to be true, it should be the case that cities with large amounts
of cheap housing do not have new construction.  If old housing were not a close
substitute for new housing, then abundance of old, cheap housing would not deter new
construction.
Table 1 reports some basic findings for the relation between growth and the extent to
which a city’s housing is valued at less than the cost of new construction.  To illustrate
the relationship, we split our sample of cities into three groups based on housing values in
                                                                                                                                                                            
which construction costs are high.  Existing homes, especially those in declining areas, are more likely to
look cheap compared to that alternative.  By choosing a modest home, we guard against that possibility.
8 We also examined the 1989 and 1991 AHS to provide a comparison to the census data.  Reported house
prices tend to be a bit higher, so fewer units are estimated to be valued below construction costs.  However,
the basic patterns discussed above are clearly evident in these data.  In addition, investigation of the 1999
AHS indicates similar regional patterns persisted throughout the 1990s.10
1990:  (a) cities with abundant cheap housing, i.e. those with over one-half of their
housing stock priced below the cost of new construction and with over 30 percent of the
total stock valued at least 20 percent below the cost of new construction;  (b) cities with
little cheap housing, i.e. those with less than 25 percent of their stock priced below the
cost of new construction and with less than 10 percent of their stock priced at least 20
percent below the cost of new construction;  and (c) cities in the middle, which are the
remaining cities.
Table 1 shows that cities with expensive housing do not necessarily grow, but cities with
cheap housing are almost uniformly shrinking.   Of the 15 cities with abundant cheap
housing in 1990, 14 lost population in the 1980s, with mean and median growth rates of
about –9 percent.  Of the 20 cities in the middle group, 11 had positive growth in the
1980s, while 9 had negative growth.  The 45 cities with little cheap housing relative to
construction costs grew at much higher rates on average.  The overall statistical
relationship between growth and the share of the housing stock that is priced below the
cost of new construction is quite strong: the correlation coefficient is –0.55 for the 1980s.
These results confirm that new homes are not built, and population does not come, to
cities with abundant cheap housing.
III.  Theory and Evidence on Skewness and Persistence
In this section, we introduce our model of durable housing and urban decline.
We consider an “open city” model where workers will continue to migrate to the city
until the utility in the city equals an outside reservation utility (denoted U ).  Thus, utility
for urban residents must equal U  at every point.  Wages and amenities are assumed to be
exogenous, independent of city population and variable over time.  The annual flow of
utility for workers in the city from wages equals W and from amenities equals A.
The housing structure of the city is the simplest form of the classic Alonso-Muth-Mills
model with only one source of heterogeneity within the city—proximity to the
downtown.  Following Solow (1973), our city is a line through the central business11
district (CBD).  Each resident works in the CBD, and pays annual commuting costs equal
to T times the distance to the city center.  Each worker must consume one unit of housing
that must sit on one unit of land.  The notation N refers to the number of homes, the
number of people in the city, and the total amount of land being used in the city.  Since
the city is a line through a point, the distance between the CBD and the edge of the city
equals N/2.  Thus, for the consumer at the edge of the city (which is N/2 units of land
from city center) the costs of commuting equal TN/2.
Housing prices within the city must in equilibrium make consumers indifferent between
living at the center and paying no commuting costs versus living elsewhere in the city.
Hence, if R(d) refers to the annual rent at distance d from the CBD, then
) 0 ( ) ( R Td d R = + , where R(0) is the rent for a house at the city center.  There is no non-
urban use for the land, so land is free at the edge of the city.  Within the city, the price of
land is determined by the demand for proximity.
The reservation utility that must be realized at every distance d from the city center at
which people live can be defined as wages plus amenities minus rent minus travel costs,
or W+A-R(d)-Td.  To simplify our notation, we use X to denote  U A W − + .  Thus, the
open city assumption of the model gives us  Td d R X + = ) ( , which implies that the
combined rental and commuting costs of living in the city must equal wages plus
amenities minus the reservation utility.
So far, we have described a completely standard urban model.  However, our focus is on
the role of housing supply and, in particular, on housing durability.  While there is an
existing literature on durable housing that is well reviewed in Brueckner (2000), we differ
from most of this literature because our primary interest is in cities in decline, not
growing cities.  Our basic housing supply assumption is that homes can always be built
with one unit of land at a cost of C.  This cost, C, is meant to correspond with the
physical costs of construction reported in the Means data.12
In addition, during each time period, a fraction of houses, δ , collapse.  These houses
must be completely rebuilt at cost C if they are to be used.  Houses collapse randomly,
and there is no decay of non-collapsing homes.  In reality, housing decay is much more
continuous.  Moving to continuous depreciation would not change the basic results of the
model, as the basic durability of housing would remain.  However, continuous
depreciation makes the model much less tractable.
9
New construction, or renovation, occurs when the expected rental flows from the
property equal the cost of new construction.  We assume that developers discount future
rent payments with a discount rate, r, and of course, there also is the probability of
collapse which further reduces the value of the flow of housing. Thus, if we let R(d, t+j)
denote the rent at distance d from the city at time t+j, for the marginal piece of new
construction it must be the case that:
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As Td j t X j t d R − + = + ) ( ) , ( , if we assume that  ) ( )) ( ( t X j t X Et = + , then equation (1)
can be rewritten as  ) /( ) ) ( )( 1 ( r Td t X r C + − + = δ .
10  This equation tells us that homes
will be built, or renovated, at distances from the CBD that are less than
) 1 /( ) ( / ) ( r C r T t X + + − δ .  At distances further than this, it will not pay to build new
homes and it will not pay to renovate collapsed homes.
In a static model where X is constant over time, the distance from the city center to the
edge will equal  ) 1 /( ) ( / r C r T X + + − δ  and the population level will equal two times this
                                                          
9 And, as the filtering literature has stressed, if the poor demand less housing quality, then a continuously
decaying housing stock will create an additional reason why the poor will live in declining cities.
10 The random walk assumption will be problematic in some places.  For example, the persistence of
growth rates implies an explosive process for X.  A more general formulation might assume that
) ) ( ( )) ( ( X t X X j t X E
j
t − + = + θ , which (as long as  θ > + r 1 ) would
imply ) 1 )( 1 /( ) ) ( ( / ) ( ) , ( θ − + + − + − = r r X t X r Td X t d P , but we will not treat this more general
case.  Our view is that this does not raise a problem within the relevant range of the data.13
amount.  In the static model, undeveloped land will be priced at zero, so we can also
determine housing prices because the price of a home at the edge of the city will equal
C.








δ , which implies that price this period equals the
discounted value of price next period plus expected revenues minus expected costs, or
r C Td X r d P / ) )( 1 ( ) ( δ − − + = .  The average housing cost in the city then equals
r C r r X r 2 / ) ) 1 ( ( 2 / ) 1 ( δ δ − − + + .  Average housing prices do not rise one-for-one with
construction costs because these costs also restrict the size of the city and lead to a
reduction in average commuting costs.  The basic structure of this urban model is
illustrated in Figure 5, with house prices being single peaked at the CBD and city size
being bounded by prices on the edge that equal construction costs.
We now consider an unexpected permanent shock to the city, so that there is a new value
of X, denoted X’, where  ε + = ′ X X .  For simplicity, we assume that this is the only
shock that is expected to occur.  If  0 > ε , then new construction will occur and there will
be an increase in housing units (and population) equal to  T / 2ε .
When  0 < ε , new construction will not occur.  The new boundary point for construction
will be  ) 1 /( ) ( / r C r T X + + − ′ δ .  Renovation will occur on homes that are closer to the
CBD than this point.  However, homes that collapse which are further from the CBD than
this point will not be rebuilt.  As of the first time period, there are  T / 2ε  homes that lie
between the old city boundary and the new point that determines efficient renovation.
Exactly  T / 2δε  homes will, therefore, collapse in this region between the first period and
the second period, and this will create the only change in population.   Over a longer time
period, between time t and time t+j the number of homes that will collapse in this region
will equal  T
j / ) ) 1 ( 1 ( 2 ε δ − − .   As j goes to infinity, the effect of a negative shock will
approach  T / 2ε , which is the effect of a positive shock.  This is illustrated in Figure 6.
                                                          
11 Because there is option value to land in a stochastic model, even the undeveloped land at the edge of the
city will have a positive value, as there is some chance that this land may be worth a positive amount in the
future.14
One of the most well known stylized facts about urban growth is that the growth rate is
orthogonal to the initial population level (Eaton and Eckstein, 1997; Glaeser et al., 1995).
For this to be the case, we will assume that  Population * µ ε = , where the mean and
variance of µ  is independent of city size.  This formulation justifies our focus on growth
rates rather than raw population growth and leads to the first proposition (proofs are in
the appendix):
Proposition 1:   If there is a shock at time t denoted  Population * µ ε = that is
unexpected, and there are no further shocks, then the distribution of population changes
between time t and t+j is leptokurtotic, in that the mean is greater than the median.  The
gap between the median and the mean of the distribution diminishes as j gets larger.
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when the median growth rate is negative.
The skewness in city population growth rates predicted by Proposition 1 is ubiquitous
throughout the 20
th century as Table 2 documents.  The first column reports the skewness
coefficients for urban growth rates in each decade from 1920 to 2000.  In every decade,
the distribution is quite skewed.  Figure 7 highlights this visually for the 1980s, a decade
in which growth rates were not abnormally skewed.  Even in the 1990s, which has the
lowest skewness coefficient by far, we can still conclude that growth rates are skewed at15
standard confidence levels (97 percent in this case).  The bottom panel of Table 2 reports
the same information for growth rates over increasingly longer time periods.  As the
model suggests, skewness becomes less severe over longer periods, but symmetry in the
distribution of urban growth rates can still be rejected over these longer intervals.
The last column in Table 2 reports the value of δ that was defined in Proposition 1.  On a
decadal basis, housing depreciation tends to have averaged from 2.5-3.5 percent per
annum until the 1960s.  The data then suggest a systematic increase in the rate of
depreciation from the 1960s onward—which empirically reflects a more symmetric path
of urban growth.  There are two plausible explanations for this higher depreciation.  First,
increasing social problems in declining cities may have led to actions (e.g. more arson)
that increased the rate of depreciation.  Second, the model may be somewhat faulty, and
the distribution of city-level shocks might have changed in the 1980s and 1990s.  There
are fewer extremely quickly growing cities (relative to the median).  The analogous
figures for multiple decade periods reported in the bottom panel of Table 2 show a
similar trend of faster depreciation in recent decades.  However, the implied rates are
lower and seem more sensible to us.
Our second proposition concerns the persistence of growth rates.  Here, we again assume
that there is a single unexpected shock at time t that is proportional to initial city size.
Proposition 2:  Growth rates will be positively correlated over time. The current growth
rate will be increasing in the lagged growth rate when the lagged growth rate is negative
and will be independent of the lagged growth rate when the lagged growth rate is
positive.
The positive relationship between current and lagged growth rates occurs because
population does not instantaneously adjust when there is a negative shock, as the rate of
decline is determined by the depreciation rate of housing.  There is no persistence of
positive shocks in this case because new housing is built to accommodate positive16
shocks.  With only one shock, the second period growth rate is zero if the first period
growth rate is positive.
The persistence of growth rates predicted by Proposition 2 is one of the most striking
features of urban growth rates.  Table 3 documents the effect of regressing current growth
on lagged growth for decades in the post-World War II era.  As suggested by the model,
we use a spline at zero and test if the impact of past growth on current growth is greater
when past growth is negative.
12  In all decades, the coefficient on past growth is higher
when past growth is negative.  In three of four cases, we can reject the equality of the two
coefficients.
Of course, as Table 3 makes clear, one aspect of the model is clearly counterfactual.
While persistence is very strong among declining cities, there also is significant serial
correlation among cities that had positive growth.  One explanation for this is that there is
serial correlation in the city-specific shocks.
13   Alternatively, it could take time to build
new houses and positive shocks to cities might only be accommodated over decades.
Nevertheless, the greater elasticity of current growth with past growth when past growth
is negative provides support for the importance of bricks and mortar in urban dynamics.
IV.  Theory and Evidence on Shocks and City Growth
We now return to the model and consider the connection between population growth,
housing price growth and exogenous shocks.  As discussed above, a population response
to a positive shock will equal  T / 2ε , and the population response to a negative shock
equals  T / 2δε .  This difference makes the relationship between population movements
and ε  convex.
                                                          
12 In each decade, we include all cities with a population level greater than 30,000 in the initial decade of
each time period.  Data from two series are used.  One is the sample of cities with consistent population
figures dating back to 1920.  The other is a much larger sample that dates back only to 1970.  This series
will be used extensively below.  The notes to the table provide the details.
13 Building this serial correlation into the model would not affect the qualitative results of the model, but
would lead to significant increases in tractability.17
As discussed above, the median housing price in the city before a shock will equal
r C r r X r 2 / ) ) 1 ( ( 2 / ) 1 ( δ δ − − + + , and prices at each distance from the city center, d,
equal  r C Td X r / ) )( 1 ( δ − − + .  After a positive shock, prices at all distances from the city
center will equal  r C Td X r / ) )( 1 ( δ − − ′ + .  The median housing price will equal
r C r r X r 2 / ) ) 1 ( ( 2 / ) 1 ( δ δ − − + ′ + , and the growth in median prices will equal
r r 2 / ) 1 ( ε + .  The growth in prices for any given house will equal  r r / ) 1 ( ε + .  The
growth in median prices equals one-half of the price growth for any given house because
as the city grows, it adds cheap housing on the fringe of the city.
When there is a negative shock, the price at each point in space equals
r C Td X r / ) )( 1 ( δ − − ′ + , with the price change for any given house equal to  r r / ) 1 ( ε + .
However, because the supply response to urban decline is limited by housing durability,
the change in the median price will not be symmetric.  For example, if housing were
completely durable, then the median house after the shock would be exactly as far from
the city center as the median house before the shock, and the price of this house would
drop by  r r / ) 1 ( ε + .  Thus, the median housing price will have declined by twice as much
in a downturn as it rises during an upturn in this case.
When housing is not completely durable, some housing far from the center collapses and
is not rebuilt.  After this collapse, the median house becomes the home that is  T 2 / δε
land units closer to the city center (because  T / δε  units of housing have collapsed on the
edge of the city).
14  Thus, the median house price declines by  r r / ) 1 ( ε +  units because
the city has become less attractive and increases in value by  r r 2 / ) 1 ( δε + −  units because
the median home is now closer to the city.  The overall change in median housing prices
equals  r r 2 / ) 2 )( 1 ( ε δ − + .  In sum, when all housing collapses each period, the impact of
shocks on prices is symmetric and when all housing is perfectly durable, the impact of
positive shocks is one-half of the size of the impact of negative shocks.  This reasoning
leads to the following proposition:
                                                          
14 This requires that the median home is itself worth renovating after the shock, which we assume to be the
case.18
Proposition 3:
a.  The effect of an exogenous shock on population will be convex around zero.
More specifically, the slope of population growth with respect to positive shocks will
equal  δ / 1  times the slope of population growth with respect to negative shocks.
b. The effect of exogenous shocks on median housing price growth will be
concave around zero.
c. The relationship between average housing price growth and population growth
will be concave around zero.
Evidence on Asymmetric Responses to Exogenous Shocks
We start with the concavity of the relationship between population growth and average
housing price growth.  There is no exogenous variable in this relationship, and this
regression is not meant to suggest causality, as both variables are being moved by
unmeasured exogenous shocks to urban productivity and urban amenities.  Instead, the
regression results reported in Table 4 test an important implication of our durable housing
stock model.
By using the log change in median house price as the dependent variable in these
regressions, we are ignoring potential changes in housing quality.  We could only
estimate reliable hedonic prices for constant quality units in 77 cities across 1980 and
1990.
15  As this is a small number of cities for our purposes, and as the correlation
between adjusted and unadjusted housing prices is quite high (63 percent), to increase our
sample size, we use the unadjusted housing prices for our regressions.
16
                                                          
15 In terms of micro data, census data from the IPUMS are superior, as the AHS samples of housing units
tend to be very small for all but the largest cities, making it difficult to adequately control for quality
differences in many cities.  Fewer cities were identified in the 1990 IPUMS, reducing the number for which
consistent data could be obtained across years.
16 Since this is the dependent variable, it is not clear that there will be any bias associated with not
controlling for quality.  The case we thought most worrisome potentially was the one in which housing
quality declines in shrinking cities and grows in rising cities. We investigated this possibility by analyzing
whether the difference between unadjusted housing price changes (i.e., in the median price) and adjusted
housing prices changes (estimated via hedonic techniques using micro data) is higher in growing or
declining cities.  This difference should reflect housing quality changes.  This difference is not significantly19
Table 4 documents the relationship between housing price changes and population
changes for our larger sample of cities that we track from 1970.  The first and second
columns report regression results for the basic spline of population during the 1970s and
1980s.  There is an economically and statistically significant difference between growing
and declining cities in the relationship between population and prices in both decades.
Figure 8’s plot illustrates the strong concavity in the relationship between price and
population changes in the raw data for the 1980s.
17  Among cities with shrinking
populations in this decade, a one percent higher rate of population decline is associated
with two percent lower prices.  Among growing cities, price change and population
change are uncorrelated.
18
A similar pattern holds for the 1970s (column 2).  Finally, Proposition 3 also applies to
rental properties, so the change in median rental prices over the 1980s is examined in the
final column.  The strong asymmetry again is apparent.  Overall, the results from Table 4
indicate that the concave relationship between changes in prices and changes in
population is a robust fact that corroborates the model.
                                                                                                                                                                            
higher in declining cities.  Also, there is no significant correlation between population growth and the
difference between adjusted and unadjusted price changes.
17 Somewhat surprising to us is the coefficient on the spline for positive population growth, which is small
and not significantly different from zero for positive growth cities in the 1980s.  In principle, this might be
explained by changing housing quality for growing cities, but the evidence regarding quality growth in this
group of cities suggests this is not the case.  It seems more likely that the lack of any positive real price
growth among these cities reflects a housing supply that is quite elastic for many of these growing cities—
at least over decade-long periods.
18While the proposition does not indicate that we should control for exogenous variables that drive city
growth, we did investigate whether the relationship documented in Table 4 and Figure 8 is robust to
inclusion of a variety of common city-level controls.  A strong and significant asymmetry remains in an
expanded specification that includes values for the following variables as of the beginning of the relevant
decade:  the fraction of single unit structures in the city, the log of city population, the family poverty rate,
and the log of median family income;  30 year weather averages for mean January temperature, mean July
temperature, and annual rainfall;  and census region dummy variables.
Finally, we also estimated similar models on the much smaller sample of 77 cities for which we
could compute the growth in constant quality prices.  While statistically significant results are not
forthcoming from the full specification, the qualitative nature of the findings still holds.  That is, the
coefficient on the negative spline of growth is relatively large and positive, while that on the negative
spline of growth is relatively small and negative.  And, if the region dummies are omitted, the quantitative
results are very similar to those reported in the first column of Table 4, with the coefficient on the spline for
positive growth being significant at the 8 percent level (t=1.8).20
We now proceed to tests using a more “exogenous” shock to the city population.  We
experiment with two sources of such shocks: the weather and industry structure.  The
weather is one of the most reliable determinants of population growth at the city and state
level.  Over the past fifty years, warm places have grown and cold places have declined.
The simple correlation between mean January temperature and city growth has ranged
from 0.47 to 0.73 in the three decades since 1970 (see Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001, for
more discussion).
Obviously, the weather of cities is not changing.  Instead, it is the demand for weather
that is changing.  Rising incomes, or improving air conditioner technology, have
increased the relative importance of the weather as an urban amenity.  In the context of
the model, this could be formalized by assuming that A=z*V, where z is the taste for the
weather and V is the weather.  The shock to X, comes through a change in z, not a change
in V.  Using this formulation, the value of ε  should be thought of as  V t z t z )) ( ) 1 ( ( − + , or
the city’s basic climatic quality times the change in the value that is placed on climate.
Of course, the variation associated with the weather can reflect other shocks (including
political ones), but for our purposes, the key is that the weather provides exogenous
variation, not that any estimated impacts only reflect a change in the value of good
weather.
19
While the weather seems to be a reasonable source of exogenous variation, it not easy to
guess at the level at which weather increases population (versus decreasing it).  To
address this issue, we use the model which tells us that the share of cities with negative
population changes will equal the share of the distribution of exogenous factors which
predict negative growth.  As 30.3 percent of our sample of cities declined in population
during the 1990s, we will assume that the lowest 30.3 percent of mean January
temperatures can be thought of as reflecting a negative population shock from the
weather.  This implies that all cities with mean January temperatures above 26.7 degrees
                                                          
19 For example, if the older and colder cities of the north systematically suffered more negative political
shocks (i.e., had more costly corruption or engaged in more intense efforts at local redistribution that
mobile firms and workers could avoid), the underlying causal force influencing population change would
be different from that just described.21
will be thought of as having a positive shock and cities with temperature levels below
that quantity will be thought of as having a negative shock.  For the 1980s, this value
changes slightly (as 33.5 percent of cities declined in the 1980s) and the cut-off becomes
28.4 degrees.  Fully 45 percent of cities suffered population declines in the 1970s, so the
spline is set at 31.8 degrees for that decade.
Table 5 shows the response of population levels to this ‘weather shock’.
20  The predicted
convexity of population change and weather shocks is evident in all three decades, as
cities with good weather grew quite rapidly, while cities with bad weather either grew
more slowly (1970s) or shrank slowly (1980s and 1990s).  It also is the case that the
relevant coefficients are significantly different from one another.
21  Figure 9 graphs the
results for the 1980s, with population growth plotted against the weather and the solid
line showing the predicted values from the regression.  While some aspects of our
procedure may seem subjective, these results are extremely robust to alternative
definitions of the positive-negative cutoff point.
22
In Table 6, we look at the response of prices to weather shocks.  The regression results in
the first column show the response of median housing prices in the 1980s.  Figure 10
plots the results.  As the model predicts, there is a strong impact of weather on prices
when the shock is negative, but only a weak effect when the shock is positive.  The next
column shows the analogous results for the 1970s.  Note that the predicted asymmetry
                                                          
20 Because population figures from the 2000 census are available, we also include regressions for changes
over the 1990s in this table.  We also estimated a specification that takes more seriously the assumption that
it is only a change in the demand for weather quality that is captured in the weather variable.  In that case,
we controlled for the fact that temperate climates are desirable and made adjustments for the fact that very
hot places (those with mean January temperatures in excess of 60 degrees Fahrenheit, more specifically)
were less desirable.  The economic and statistical nature of the findings is largely unchanged.
21We also estimated specifications that included other local controls as of the beginning of the relevant
decade.  These included the fraction of single unit residences and beginning of period population, poverty
rate, and median family income.  Adding these controls has very little impact, statistically or economically,
on the estimated impacts of bad and good weather.  Because region controls are so strongly correlated with
the weather, we do not think they should be included.  However, as further check on robustness, we also
performed the estimation with them included.  The basic asymmetry still is evident with region controls,
but the results are less precise so that we no longer can conclude that there is any significant difference in
the two relevant coefficients in this case.   
22 Furthermore, since the proposition technically deals only with previously growing cities, we have
checked that our results still hold for cities that only grew during the previous decade.22
does not hold here.
23  The final column reports results for the 1980s using median rental
prices.  Once again, the basic asymmetry exists, with prices responding more strongly to
negative shocks.  Hence, the data from the 1980s, but not the 1970s, confirm this part of
Proposition 3.
24
We now proceed to a similar analysis using an industry structure variable in the 1980s.
Here we use the initial share of manufacturing employment in the city as a source of
exogenous urban variation.  This is defined as the sum of each city’s employment share
in durables and non-durables goods manufacturing.  The de-urbanization of
manufacturing that has occurred suggests that cities with large initial shares of
employment in manufacturing have suffered negative shocks.  Consistent with our
approach above, we presume that 33.5 percent of cities suffered negative shocks (i.e., the
number of cities receiving negative shocks equals the number of cities that declined
during the period).  Transforming the variable into one minus the employment share in
manufacturing (so that lower values represent ‘negative shocks’ to be consistent with the
weather variable above) leads us to spline the data at 74.6 percent.  This implies that
cities with manufacturing employment shares above 25.4 percent are presumed to have
negative shocks.
Table 7 reports our results.  The point estimates in column one still exhibit the asymmetry
predicted by the model, with positive shocks having a stronger impact on population
growth.
25  In the next regression, we look at the price response to these industry level
shocks.  Here the results do not match the model.  Increases in demand tend to be related
to lower prices, especially when demand shocks are negative.  Not only is this
incompatible with a model of durable housing, it is also incompatible with any model in
which housing supply is positively sloped.
                                                          
23 Real house price growth was quite strong if there was a positive or negative weather shock during that
decade.  For example, real median house price appreciation in our cities was 24.3 percent during the 1970s
versus only 7.5 percent in the 1980s.  Moreover, the housing price change distribution changed radically
between the decades.  The variance about the mean was a relatively low 4.5 percent in the 1970s versus 9.5
percent in the 1980s.  The distribution was much more skewed in the 1980s, with its skewness coefficient
being 0.78 versus 0.003 for the 1970s.
24 As with the results in Table 5 on population changes and weather, adding common local controls does
not change the findings in any important way—for the 1970s and the 1980s.23
A close examination of the data reveals the observations that are driving this particular
finding.  In the 1980s, there are a number of one-time manufacturing cities near New
York City and Boston that had substantial price increases because they switched from
being centers of production to being more suburban-like residential centers.  These cities
are predicted to decline but in fact experience significant housing price increases.
26  If we
exclude these cities in the New York-Northern New Jersey and  Boston-Lawrence-Salem
CMSAs (other than New York City and Boston) and the Providence Metropolitan
Statistical Area, this perverse result goes away.  However, even excluding those cities
does not allow us to recover the any meaningful asymmetry between positive and
negative shocks that we saw in Table 6 with respect to the weather.
VI.  Housing Prices and Urban Decline
At this point, we return to our empirical work connecting the abundance of below cost
housing with urban decline.  Naturally, we do not suggest that this connection is causal—
indeed the model explicitly argues that cheap housing will be the result of past negative
shocks.  Instead, our goal is to document the predictive power of housing market prices.
We turn again to the model and consider the growth rates of cities one period after a
shock.  In period one, there is an unexpected shock to urban productivity or amenities.
There will immediately be a price response to that shock.  If the shock is positive, then
none of the housing that currently exists will cost less than the price of new construction.
If the shock is negative then all houses beyond  ) 1 /( ) ( / r C r T X + + − ′ δ  units of distance
from the city center will be priced less than the cost of new construction.  There will be
T / 2ε −  such houses.  The total share of housing that costs less than the price of new
construction will thus equal:  () ) 1 /( ) ( / r C r T X + + − − δ ε , which we denote as “S”.  The
                                                                                                                                                                            
25 The pattern still holds after controlling for a variety of local controls.
26 Because of this problem, the overall connection between this variable and price change is not even
positive, rendering it an ineffective demand shift instrument.24
change in population equals  T / 2δε , or  () T S r C r T X / ) 1 /( ) ( 2 + + − − δ δ , which implies
the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Expected population growth is declining in the share of the housing stock
with prices below the cost of new construction.
At first blush, it would seem that a connection between housing prices and population
growth is not surprising.  After all, housing prices should reflect expectations about
future growth so that one might expect higher price areas to grow more.  We have two
ways of addressing this concern.  First, we can control for median housing prices in the
regression analysis.  Second, we can also show that there is no meaningful relationship
between our housing price measure—the share of the city’s housing stock that is priced
below the cost of new construction—and the growth of real house prices over the next ten
years.  The simple correlation between the two variables is 0.06 and the adjusted R-
square from regressing real price appreciation over the 1980s on the fraction of stock
priced below construction costs in 1980 is –0.002.  It seems unlikely that this variable is
actually capturing expectations, perhaps because long-run housing prices are just too
unpredictable.
Empirical Results
Table 8 shows our first results on the connection between urban growth and the share of
the housing stock priced below the cost of new construction.  The construction of this
variable was discussed above and is described in detail in the appendix.  The results in
the first two columns illustrate the connection between our variable and population
growth in the 1980s.  The first specification includes only the fraction of the city’s
housing stock that is valued below the cost of new construction.  The coefficient of -0.32
implies that for every 10 percent more of the housing stock that is priced below the cost
of new construction, the growth rate of population is reduced by just over 3 percent.  The
r-squared of the regression is 38 percent, corresponding to over a 60 percent correlation
coefficient between this variable and growth over the next 10 years.  Apart from lagged25
growth, this construction cost and price variable is the best we have for predicting cities’
future growth.
The second specification includes a rich set of other controls.  These include the median
housing price at the beginning of the decade, as well as a variable capturing the share of
the housing stock that sells for at least a 30 percent premium to construction costs.
Interestingly, these other housing price variables do not predict positive growth.  In fact,
cities with lots of expensive housing tend to have lower growth in the 1980s, possibly
because they are facing supply constraints.  The median value of housing has no
predictive content for growth in the 1980s once we have controlled for the other
variables.  The coefficient on the share price below construction costs is almost
unchanged from the first model.
27
The final two specifications in Table 8 include findings for the 1990s.  The results are
less stable, but the fraction of housing stock valued below construction cost variable has a
significantly negative coefficient unless lagged growth is included.  While the percentage
of the stock valued at least 1.3 times construction costs is not independently significant in
the 1990s, it is its inclusion which is associated with the doubling of the coefficient on
the fraction of the stock priced below construction costs.
28   While the impressive
connection between cheap housing and future decline cannot be considered surprising as
the underlying economics could not be more straightforward, the power of the variable
suggests that the housing market really does mediate urban growth.
29
                                                          
27 For completeness, we also estimated a specification that included the lagged population growth rate from
the 1970s.  In the model, the share of housing that is priced below construction costs is capturing urban
decline and as such, we do not necessarily expect much of an impact of this variable once we control for
lagged population growth.  Yet, the fraction of the housing stock priced below construction costs at the
beginning of the decade still matters.  The coefficient drops by about one-quarter, but it remains significant.
Places with much housing priced below the cost of new construction just do not grow.
28 By 1990, there is a very strong regional concentration in the west of cities with substantial fractions of
their housing stocks priced well above construction costs.  If the region controls are dropped, the
coefficient on the fraction of stock priced at least 30 percent above construction cost rises substantially in
absolute value (the coefficient becomes negative in this case) and is highly statistically significant.
29 It is noteworthy that the alternative measure of housing price based on the constant quality price series
discussed above confirms the findings in this section.  When that measure of housing price premium26
VII.  Human Capital and Urban Decline
In this section, we address the connection between human capital, the housing stock and
urban decline.  At this point, we assume that there are high human capital types and low
human capital types.  Otherwise, the model is unchanged.  Low human capital types
receive wages of W, pay transport costs of T, and have a reservation utility outside of the
city that is equal to U .  High human capital types have wages equal to  W ) 1 ( + φ , travel
costs equal to  T ) 1 ( + φ , and reservation utility equal to U .  The fact that travel costs and
wages scale by the same amount is meant to capture the time costs of travel.  The crucial
aspect of the model is not that transport costs and wages scale identically, but that the
high human capital types have both higher wages and higher commuting costs.
Significantly, high and low human capital types are assumed to receive the same utility
flow from amenities.
At this point, we address empirically our assumption that human capital acts to multiply
city level productivity.  We examined mean hourly wage rates in 1990 for full-time (or
nearly full-time) workers of various skill groupings for samples of growing and declining
cities.
30  We split the sample into cities which gained population over the 1980s and cities
that lost population over the 1990s.   On average, workers in the growing cities indeed
earned more than workers in the declining cities.  If there are different levels of “W” in
those two samples, then our model requires that the higher levels of W in growing cities
impact all workers in proportion to their base wages.
                                                                                                                                                                            
relative to construction costs is used as the dependent variable, it, too, strongly predicts future growth.
Those results are available upon request.
30 The figures discussed below are unweighted means of the city means.   The underlying figures
themselves reflect averages across workers in each city that were computed using 1990 census data from
the IPUMs.  The samples were restricted to city residents who reported substantial labor market and work
activity in 1989.  More specifically, the individual worked at least 40 weeks during the year and typically
worked at least 20 hours per week.  The range of ages was restricted to between 19 and 59.  Hourly wages
were computed by dividing reported wage and salary income by total hours worked during 1989.  Total
hours worked was computed as the multiple of weeks worked and usual hours worked per week.  We
experimented with different treatments for outliers (e.g., individuals who worked 80 hours per week, 52
weeks per year), but the results are not sensitive how we dealt with them.  The wage rates reported just
below presume that everyone took at least two weeks of vacation, that nobody typically worked more than
60 hours per week, and that nobody working at least 800 hours (the minimum required to be in our sample)
earned less than $1,000.27
To examine this hypothesis, we divided workers into four skill groups based on their
educational achievement:  high school dropouts (i.e. those with less than 12 years of
schooling), high school graduates (those with exactly 12 years of schooling), people with
some college (those with more than 12 and less than 16 years of schooling), and college
graduates (those with more than 16 years of schooling).   The difference in average wages
across growing versus shrinking cities then was computed for each group.  The wage gap
was –1.3 percent for the dropouts (i.e., they earned slightly less in growing cities), 5.4
percent for the high school graduates, 7.5 percent for those with some college and 4.5
percent for college graduates.  These numbers are just mean percentage differences, but
controlling for other factors makes little difference.
31
For the three highest groups, the assumption of proportionately seems basically correct.
However, high school dropouts actually earn slightly more in declining cities.  This may
be because of omitted human capital controls, or because improving city level
productivity impacts the skilled more than the less skilled.  While this does not support
our assumption exactly, it makes the empirical relationship between decline and poverty
even more understandable.  If we were to assume that negative shocks lower wages for
high human capital people even more than for low human capital people, our basic
theoretical result— population declines are associated with a greater population share for
the less skilled—would follow even more easily.
However, we stick with our proportionately assumption and given this assumption,
people with high levels of human capital will live closer to the city center.
32   The
                                                          
31 Because the underlying sample sizes of workers are small in some cities for certain skill groups
(especially for dropouts), we computed the analogous figures for more aggregated groupings.  For example,
dividing workers into two skill categories, with the low skill group having 12 or fewer years of schooling,
finds that wages for this group are 2.8 percent lower on average in declining cities;  wages for the high skill
group (i.e., those with at least some college training) are 5.5 percent lower on average in declining cities.
Finally, we also examined wage differences by occupation.  Very small sample sizes for individual
occupations in most cities forced us to aggregate across many occupations.  However, it proved possible to
compute mean wages for groups of pretty clearly defined skill groups (e.g., engineers and scientists versus
various low level service personnel).  Those results are consistent with those for those just discussed.
32 Of course, this is counter-factual in some cases.  ), this is true.  A richer model (see Glaeser, Kahn and
Rappaport, 2000), with better predictions about where the poor and rich live, would still find that the poor
would live disproportionately in declining cities.28
equilibrium population of the city will be characterized by two key equations.  The first is
the furthest point where it pays to construct new housing or renovate old housing.  Since
the low human capital types live at the edge of the city, this point is determined by their
parameter values.  The edge of construction will equal  ) 1 /( ) ( / ) ( r C r T U A W + + − − + δ ,
just as before, and we denote this distance d .  In the completely static city, the
population will again equal two times this amount.
There is also a distance which marks the furthest point at which high human capital types
will live, which is denoted d*.  This is the point at which low and high human capital
types are willing to pay equal rents.  The rental payments in the high human capital
region of the city equal  Td R ) 1 ( ) 0 ( φ + − , and, the open city assumption tells us that
U A W R − + + = ) 1 ( ) 0 ( φ .  The rental payments in the low human capital region of the
city equal  ) ( ) ( d d T d R − + and the open city assumption requires that
d T U A W d R − − + = ) ( .  Solving these equations tells us  T d T d R R d φ / ) ) ( ) 0 ( ( * − − = ,
or  . / ) ( / * T U U T W d φ − − =    In a static city, the share of the city that is high human
capital equals the ratio of d* to d : )) 1 /( ) ( /( ) / ) ( ( r C r T U A W U U W + + − − + − − δ φ .
We assume that this is less than one.  Differentiation reveals that the skill level of the city
will be (a) rising with W, (b) falling with A, (c) rising with C, (d) rising with U , and (e)
falling with U .  Thus, growing cities will tend to increase their skill quantity if the
growth is the result of W and decrease their skill quantity if the growth is the result of A.
As we have observed throughout this paper, the durability of housing will mute the
population losses at far distances from the city center.  This means that declining cities
will tend to lose fewer low human capital individuals than they would if housing
depreciated instantaneously.  More precisely, consider a city with an innovation to both
wages and amenities (denoted  W ∆  and  A ∆  respectively).  If these innovations are
positive, the increase in population will equal  T A W / ) ( 2 ∆ + ∆ .  The change in the skill29
level will be positive if the change in wages dominates and negative if the change in
amenities dominates.
However, when the city shrinks, assuming that the decline is sufficiently modest so that it
still pays to maintain the housing of the high human capital types, decreases in population
will equal - T A W / ) ( 2 ∆ + ∆ δ , and the change in the skill level will differ, because the
housing on the edge of the city decays only slowly.
Declining amenity levels generally will lead to increasing skill levels, but the effect will
be smaller than the impact of rising amenities on skill levels (by roughly the ratio 1/δ ).
Decreasing wages will have a greater impact on decreasing skill levels than increasing
wages will have on increasing skill levels.  This asymmetry occurs because there are
large amounts of low cost housing that disproportionately attract the poor remain in the
city.  The following statement formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 5:  If  A W z∆ = ∆ , and z is such that population increases are skill neutral,
then population decreases will be associated with declining levels of human capital.
Since we do not know whether rising population levels are coming from amenities or
wages, we do not know whether increases in population will cause increased skills or not.
However, we do know that the decreases in population will be much more likely to be
associated with declining skill levels, even when the co-movement of amenities and
wages is symmetric.
Empirical Results
Tables 9-12 report empirical results on the connection between city growth and human
capital levels.  We begin with two conventional measures of education: the share of
college graduates (Table 9) and the share of high school dropouts (Table 10).
The first regression in Table 9, for the 1980s, shows the relationship between the share of
the city’s population that has a college degree and city growth.  The primary independent30
variable is the growth rate of population and we use a spline at zero.  The results indicate
that greater population decline is associated with sharply falling skill levels when city
population growth is negative.  However, when cities grow they actually face a decrease
in the share of the population that are college graduates (although the effect is not
statistically significant).  This pattern is compatible with amenities being more important
to city growth than wages.  This could create a situation where both increases and
decreases in population lead to declines in the skill level.
In the second specification, we include a rich set of controls including region dummies
and a host of initial controls.  We also control for the change in the share of the
population that is Hispanic.   This control is important because many of the growing
cities of the west grow because of increasing Hispanic populations.  When we include
these controls, there is still an asymmetry whereby less sharp decline leads to more
college graduates as a share of population when population growth is negative, while it
has no significant impact when population growth is positive.
In the third regression, we add a control for the log of the median value of housing at the
end of the time period.  The model suggests that poor people come to declining cities
primarily because of the availability of cheap housing.  If this is the case, then controlling
for housing prices should eliminate the connection between city growth and increasing
human capital levels for declining cities.  We see that this is indeed the case.  The
housing price control, and no other local variable, has the effect of eliminating the
connection.  This supports our contention that housing markets enable us to understand
why there is a strong connection between declining cities and declining skill levels.
Because our explanation of the connection between urban decline and urban deskilling
rests on the poor and less-skilled losing relatively less from lower wages and gaining
relatively more from lower house prices in declining cities, it is useful to know more
about the magnitudes of wage and housing prices declines in shrinking cities.  The
differences in wage outcomes in growing versus declining cities pale in comparison to
the differences in mean house prices.  For cities that lost population in the 1980s, the31
mean house price (of the means for the 31 declining cities in the sample for which we
were able to compute mean wages by skill category) was $61,342.  This is 49 percent
below the mean of $119,177 for the 65 cities that gained population in the 1980s.  The
abundance of relatively cheap housing in declining cities combined with the fact that
wages for lower skilled workers are not lower in declining cities (especially compared to
the situation for higher skilled workers) bolsters the case for our hypothesis that these
places are relatively attractive to this group.
Regressions (4)-(6) of Table 9 repeat regressions (1)-(3) for the 1970s.  The results are
similar.  Lower population growth is associated with falling human capital levels when
population growth is negative, but not when population growth is positive.  Here, we
really seem to be close to the situation described in the proposal where city-level shocks
are neutral on the upside but strongly decrease skill levels on the downside.  Once again,
including a rich set of local controls leaves the results virtually unchanged (column 5),
but controlling for the logarithm of the median value of housing at the end of the period
again eliminates the connection between population decline and declining skills during
this time period.
Table 10 repeats this exercise using the share of adults over 25 years of age in the city
with less than 12 years of schooling as the dependent variable.  In this case, local
controls—the change in Hispanic population share especially—are needed for the results
to support the model.
33  In the absence of those controls, the first column shows that
rising population generally is associated with rising dropout rates in the 1980s.  As
suggested by the findings from the second specification, this is due to the fact that many
high growth cities in the west and southwest had increasing Hispanic populations which
tend not to be highly educated.  When this factor is controlled for, less negative growth in
declining cities strongly decreases the share of the population that dropped out of high
school.  For growing cities, the point estimate is less than half that for declining cities.
The specification in the third column includes the housing price variable, but it has little
effect on the findings in this case.
                                                          
33 We find similar results to those in column 2 if we exclude cities with large Hispanic populations.32
The final three specifications examine dropouts in the 1970s.  The pattern of results is
very similar to that for the 1980s.  This time, including the housing price variable makes
the population-dropout relationship statistically insignificant among declining cities,
providing further evidence that housing prices explain why the poor come to declining
cities.
Tables 11 and 12 look at income-based measures of human capital: median family
income and the poverty rate.  These variables are problematic because if rising population
levels are caused by rising wages, then we should expect to see a positive relationship
even if the housing market factors that dominate our model are not important.
Nonetheless, since these measures may be better measures of human capital than
educational degrees, we repeat the analysis using them.
The first regression in Table 11 shows that population growth and rising income are
closely linked when population growth is negative but not when population growth is
positive.  This again supports the model.  While a general connection between rising
growth and rising wages should occur whenever rising labor demand drives growth, the
asymmetry in the results makes this seem less likely to be causing the relationship, as it
requires a complicated story whereby labor demand drives declining cities but labor
supply drives growing cities.  Among declining cities, a one percent decline in growth in
the 1980s is associated with a 1.14 percent decrease in real income.  Including the
standard set of local controls does not change the basic result (column 2).  However,
controlling for the end of period median housing price does eliminate much of the
connection between income growth and population growth among declining cities.  We
have repeated these regressions for the 1970s and found extremely similar results.  In the
1970s, there is no relationship between income growth and population growth, once we
control for the end-of-period price of housing.
Table 12 then presents results using the change in the poverty rate as the dependent
variable.  The asymmetry shows up in this variable as well.  Greater population losses33
strongly increase the poverty rate for declining cities, but not for growing cities.  Our
other controls do not affect the result, but controlling for the end period housing price
does materially reduce the impact.  We find similar results using poverty rates in the
1970s.
Tables 9-12 have documented a strong connection between falling population and
decreasing skills (and incomes) among declining cities, but little connection among
growing cities.   The tendency of declining cities to disproportionately attract the poor is
particularly important if concentrations of poverty then further deter growth.  If low skill
cities have lower rates of innovation or have social problems that then repel future
residents, the tendency of cheap housing to attract the poor can create a vicious cycle.  A
preliminary urban decline can cause the skill composition of the city to shift.  Then, this
lower skill composition can drive out future residents and further depress the growth of
the city.  These dynamic considerations are a pressing topic for future research.
VIII.  Conclusion
Heretofore, the urban growth literature has not considered the physical nature of cities as
an important factor in explaining urban dynamics.  While the durability of housing may
not be a crucial element of urban dynamics for growing cities, it is the key to
understanding the nature of urban decline, and we are in an era of decline for many our
major cities.  Consequently, we develop a dynamic version of the Mills-Muth-Alonso
model in which housing is durable and can explain five key features of urban change.
First, city growth rates are leptokurtotic.  The durability of the housing stock can explain
why cities grow much faster than they decline.  Second, the persistence of city growth is
particularly striking.  The degree of persistence is strongest among declining cities—as
predicted by our bricks and mortar model of urban dynamics.  Third, exogenous shocks
lead to (different) asymmetric responses of population and house prices.  Negative shocks
have a relatively small impact on population growth, especially among declining cities, as
the durability of housing leads to declines in demand being reflected more in prices than34
in people.  Conversely, the ability to build means that positive shocks have greater impact
on growth because new supply dampens the effect on prices.  Both asymmetries are
borne out in the data.  Fourth, the distribution of house prices is an excellent predictor of
future population growth.  In particular, the data show that growth is quite rare in cities
with large fractions of their housing stock valued below the cost of new construction.
This link is not causal, but rather illustrates the role the housing market plays in
mediating growth.  Fifth, the model helps explain why cities in greater decline tend to
have lower levels of human capital, as cheap housing is relatively more attractive to the
poor.  This is confirmed in the data in terms of the share of college graduates, the share of
high school drop outs, real income growth, and changes in poverty rates.  This finding
may help us understand the correlation between urban decline and urban social problems.35
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Appendix 1:  Construction of the House Value/Construction Cost Ratio
A number of adjustments are made to the underlying house price data in the comparison
of prices to construction costs.  These include imputation of the square footage of living
area for observations from the IPUMS for the 1980 and 1990 census years.  Following
that, we make three adjustments to the house price data to account for the depreciation
that occurs on older homes, to account for general inflation when comparing across years,
and to account for the fact that research shows owners tend to overestimate the value of
their homes.  Finally, we make an adjustment to construction costs in order to account for
the wide regional variation in the presence of basements.  The remainder of this
Appendix provides the details.
First, the square footage of living area must be imputed for each observation in 1980 and
1990 from the IPUMS.  Because the AHS contains square footage information, we begin
by estimating square footage in that data set, using housing traits that are common to the
AHS and IPUMS data.  This set includes the age of the building (AGE and its square),
whether there is a full kitchen (KITFULL), the number of bedrooms (BEDROOMS), the
number of bathrooms (BATHROOMS), the number of other rooms (OTHROOMS), a
dummy variable for the presence of central air conditioning (AIRCON), controls for the
type of home heating system (HEAT, with controls for the following types:  gas, oil,
electric, no heat), a dummy variable for detached housing unit status (DETACHED),
dummy variables for each metropolitan area (MSA), and dummy variables for the U.S.
census regions (REGION).
Thus, the linear specification estimated is of the following form:
SQUARE FOOTAGEi = f{AGEi, AGE
2
i, BEDROOMSi, BATHROOMSi, KITFULLi,
OTHROOMSi, AIRCONi, HEATi, DETACHEDi, MSAi,
REGIONi}
34,
                                                          
34 Data frequently was missing for the presence of air conditioning (AIRCON) and the number of other
rooms (OTHROOMS).  So as not to substantially reduce the number of available observations, we coded in
the mean for these variables when the true value was missing.  Special dummies were included in the
specification estimated to provide separate effects of the true versus assigned data.37
The subscript i indexes the house observations and separate regressions are run using the
1985 and 1989 AHS data.  Our samples include only single unit, owned residences in
central cities (which can be attached or detached).
35  The overall fits are reasonably good,
with the adjusted R-squares being .391 in the 1985 data and .306 in the 1989 data.
The 1985 coefficients are then used to impute the square footage of the observations from
the 1980 IPUMS, and the 1989 coefficients are used analogously for the 1990 IPUMS
sample.  Once house value is put into price per square foot form, it can be compared to
the construction cost per square foot data from the R.S. Means Company.
However, we make other adjustments before actually making that comparison.  One
adjustment takes into account the fact that research shows owners tend to overestimate
the value of their homes.  Following the survey and recent estimation by Goodman &
Ittner, 1992, we presume that owners typically overvalue their homes by 6 percent.
36
A second, and empirically more important, adjustment takes into account the fact that the
vast majority of our homes are not new and have experienced real depreciation.
Depreciation factors are estimated using the AHS and then applied to the IPUMS data.
More specifically, we regress house value per square foot (scaled down by the Goodman
& Ittner, 1992, correction) in the relevant year (1985 or 1989) on a series of age controls
and metropolitan area dummies.  The age data is in interval form so that we can tell if a
house is from 0-5 years old, from 6-10 years old, from 11-25 years old, from 25-36 years
old, and more than 45 years old.
37  The coefficients on the age controls are each negative
as expected and represent the extent to which houses of different ages have depreciated in
value on a per square foot basis.
Because the regressions use nominal data, we make a further adjustment for the fact that
general price inflation occurred between 1980-1985 and 1989-1990.  In the case of
                                                          
35 We excluded observations with extreme square footage values, deleting those with less than 500 square
feet and more than 5,000 square feet of living area (4,000 square feet in the 1989 survey is the top code).
36 This effect turns out to be relatively minor in terms of its quantitative impact on the results.
37 Slightly different intervals are reported in the AHS and IPUMS.  We experimented with transformations
based on each surveys intervals.  The different matching produce very similar results.38
applying the 1985 results to the 1980 IPUMS data, we scale down the implied
depreciation factor by the percentage change in the rental cost component of the
Consumer Price Index between 1980 and 1985.  In the case of applying the 1989 results
to the 1990 IPUMS observations, we scale up the implied depreciation factor in an
analogous fashion.
38
Finally, we make an adjustment for the fact that there is substantial regional and cross-
metropolitan area variation in the presence of basements.  Having a basement adds
materially to construction costs according to the Means data.  Units with unfinished
basements have about 10 percent higher construction costs depending on the size of the
unit.  Units with finished basements have up to 30 percent higher construction costs,
again depending on the size of the unit.  Our procedure effectively assumes that units
with a basement in the AHS have unfinished basements, so that we underestimate
construction costs for units with finished basements.  Unfortunately, the IPUMS data in
1980 and 1990 do not report whether the housing units have a basement.  However, using
the AHS data we can calculate the probability that a housing unit in a specific U.S. census
division has a basement.  The divisional differences are extremely large, ranging from 1.3
percent in the West South Central census division to 94.9 percent in the Middle Atlantic
census division.  Thus, in the West South Central census division we assume that each
unit has 0.013 basements, and that each unit in the Middle Atlantic division has 0.949
basements.  Because of the very large gross differences in the propensity to have
basements, this adjustment almost certainly reduces measurement error relative to
assuming all units have basements or that none have basements.
After these adjustments, house value is then compared to construction costs to produce
the distributions reported in the main text.
                                                          
38 The depreciation factors themselves are relatively large.  After making the inflation and Goodman-Ittner
correction, the results for 1980 suggest that a house that was 6-11 years old was worth $3.17 per square
foot less than a new home.  Very old homes (i.e., 46+ years) were estimated to be worth $11.94 per square
foot less than a new home that year.39
Appendix 2: Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1:   If there is a shock at time t denoted  Population * µ ε = that is
unexpected, and there are no further shocks, then the distribution of population changes
between time t and t+j is leptokurtotic, in that the mean is greater than the median.  The
gap between the median and the mean of the distribution diminishes as j gets larger.
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when the median growth rate is negative.
Proof:  When 0 > t ε , then 
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 which is positive, but also goes to zero as
j gets large.
For the second part of the theorem, we define  µ µ ˆ − = e , where µ ˆ  is the median and
mean of µ , and e is then a variable that is symmetrically distributed around zero.  Using
the symmetry of e, we know that for any number “z”,  ) ( ) ( z e e E z e e E > − = < , which
implies
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and the first formula follows.  For the second formula, we use the following:
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and the second formula follows.41
Proposition 2:  Growth rates will be positively correlated over time. The current growth
rate will be increasing in the lagged growth rate when the lagged growth rate is negative
and will be independent of the lagged growth rate when the lagged growth rate is
positive.
Proof:   In the first period, if there is a positive shock the city immediately adjusts and
there is no further growth—thus there is no correlation between first period growth and
second period growth.  If during the first period, there is a negative shock, then growth
rate in the first period will equal  T N / 2δµ = ∆ , and growth during the second period
equals  T / ) 1 ( 2 δµ δ − , which is obviously correlated with first period growth positively
(perfectly in fact).  If there was a second period shock, the first and second period growth
rates would still be orthogonal, if the first period growth was positive (since, after a
period of a positive shock) the city is basically starting afresh.  If there is a negative
shock, then in the second period, there will still be a positive correlation because of the
tendency of the housing stock priced below the cost of new construction to decay and not
be replaced.
Proposition 3:
a.  The effect of exogenous on population will be convex around zero, and mores
specifically, the slope of population growth with respect to positive shocks will equal
δ / 1  times the slope of population growth with respect to negative shocks.
b. The effect of exogenous shocks on median housing price growth will be
concave around zero.
c. The relationship between average housing price growth and population growth
will be concave around zero.
Proof:  For (a), in the case of a positive shock,  T N / 2ε = ∆ ;  in the case of a negative
shock,  T N / 2δε = ∆ .  If the size of µ , is identified, then the ratio of the slopes holds.
For (b), in the text we argued  that a negative shock leads to a total change of
r r 2 / ) 2 )( 1 ( ε δ − +  in housing prices and a positive shock leads to a total change of
r r 2 / ) 1 ( ε + .  It is again obvious that the slope with respect to the exogenous shock is42
greater when the exogenous shock is positive than when the shock is negative, and thus
the relationship is piecewise linear in the shock and convex around zero.
For (c),  the slope of housing price growth (in percentage terms) on percentage
changes in population will equal 
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, it follows that slope is concave with a kink at zero.
Proposition 4: Expected population growth is declining in the share of the housing stock
with prices below the cost of new construction.
Proof: The change in population equals  T / 2δε , or  () T S r C r T X / ) 1 /( ) ( 2 + + − − δ δ , so
the population change will be declining in S—the share of the housing stock that costs
less than the price of new construction.
Proposition 5:  If  A W z∆ = ∆ , and z equals 
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increases are skill neutral, then population decreases will be associated with declining
levels of human capital.
Proof: For population changes to be skill neutral, it must be the case the ratio of high
skill people to total population is equal before and after the shock, i.e.:
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where H refers to the initial skill level,
)) 1 /( ) ( /( ) / ) ( ( r C r T U A W U U W + + − − + − − δ φ .  After a negative shock, the value of
d* becomes  T U U T W W φ / ) ( / ) ( − − ∆ +  and the population of high human capital
individuals is twice this amount.
The total population of the city  )) 1 /( ) ( 2 / ) ( 2 r C r T U A W + + − − + δ  is reduced by
T A W / ) ( 2 ∆ + ∆ δ  after a negative shock.  This means that the ratio of high skill to total
population after a negative shock equals:
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which must always hold, as long as (A7) holds (recall that both shocks are negative).44
Appendix 3--Table 1:  House Price/Construction Cost Distribution, Summary Statistics, 1980










%houses valued at least
20% above construction
costs(0.5=50%)
Honolulu city HI 0.003 0.009 0.983
Anaheim city CA 0.007 0.012 0.967
San Diego city CA 0.018 0.031 0.936
San Francisco city CA 0.020 0.033 0.913
Oxnard city CA 0.015 0.040 0.874
Las Vegas city NV 0.023 0.053 0.763
Riverside city CA 0.019 0.059 0.772
Denver city CO 0.011 0.071 0.862
Los Angeles city CA 0.032 0.071 0.884
Washington city DC 0.018 0.077 0.825
Fort Lauderdale city FL 0.045 0.079 0.771
Vallejo city CA 0.037 0.087 0.746
Madison city WI 0.008 0.088 0.630
Santa Barbara city CA 0.038 0.093 0.765
Salt Lake City city UT 0.043 0.104 0.682
Bridgeport city CT 0.062 0.110 0.646
Ann Arbor city MI 0.022 0.118 0.687
Albuquerque city NM 0.059 0.131 0.672
New Orleans city LA 0.038 0.133 0.744
Fresno city CA 0.072 0.153 0.622
Seattle city WA 0.060 0.155 0.677
Minneapolis city MN 0.041 0.180 0.466
Newport News city VA 0.049 0.181 0.562
Colorado Springs city CO 0.044 0.186 0.506
Raleigh city NC 0.088 0.189 0.666
Bakersfield city CA 0.069 0.193 0.538
Portland city OR 0.051 0.202 0.573
Charleston city SC 0.091 0.203 0.603
Eugene city OR 0.050 0.204 0.485
Miami city FL 0.089 0.224 0.586
New Haven city CT 0.075 0.229 0.492
Charlotte city NC 0.092 0.242 0.565
Tulsa city OK 0.114 0.242 0.562
Columbia city SC 0.096 0.254 0.611
Tucson city AZ 0.111 0.255 0.526
Huntsville city AL 0.097 0.257 0.528
Phoenix city AZ 0.108 0.259 0.509
Greensboro city NC 0.108 0.261 0.494
Austin city TX 0.117 0.262 0.558
Norfolk city VA 0.061 0.262 0.47345
Appendix 3, Table 1 (cont.d)
Nashville-Davidson city TN 0.123 0.263 0.496
Oklahoma City city OK 0.123 0.274 0.512
Lexington-Fayette city KY 0.096 0.286 0.448
Little Rock city AR 0.116 0.291 0.522
Stockton city CA 0.137 0.306 0.456
Winston-Salem city NC 0.146 0.306 0.527
Orlando city FL 0.163 0.320 0.423
Richmond city VA 0.124 0.323 0.423
Jackson city MS 0.175 0.326 0.430
Davenport city IA 0.111 0.329 0.397
Sacramento city CA 0.148 0.332 0.481
Knoxville city TN 0.184 0.339 0.419
Houston city TX 0.184 0.340 0.494
Shreveport city LA 0.201 0.352 0.474
Albany city NY 0.167 0.356 0.292
El Paso city TX 0.140 0.356 0.410
Milwaukee city WI 0.129 0.358 0.281
Baton Rouge city LA 0.218 0.365 0.461
Tacoma city WA 0.136 0.370 0.321
New York city NY 0.086 0.376 0.311
Roanoke city VA 0.121 0.383 0.316
Dallas city TX 0.231 0.387 0.482
Wichita city KS 0.179 0.406 0.355
Peoria city IL 0.204 0.418 0.307
Mobile city AL 0.215 0.430 0.360
Memphis city TN 0.207 0.433 0.346
Durham city NC 0.176 0.441 0.369
Lorain city OH 0.142 0.446 0.230
Cincinnati city OH 0.198 0.450 0.301
Chattanooga city TN 0.208 0.460 0.304
Chicago city IL 0.219 0.465 0.307
Tampa city FL 0.250 0.471 0.327
Birmingham city AL 0.206 0.477 0.285
Fort Wayne city IN 0.263 0.480 0.227
Providence city RI 0.163 0.484 0.338
Baltimore city MD 0.237 0.502 0.228
Fort Worth city TX 0.347 0.505 0.339
Columbus city OH 0.211 0.515 0.234
Spokane city WA 0.171 0.520 0.211
Des Moines city IA 0.220 0.525 0.210
Hartford city CT 0.230 0.526 0.199
Rockford city IL 0.236 0.533 0.205
Topeka city KS 0.262 0.536 0.172
Waterbury city CT 0.206 0.549 0.163
Kalamazoo city MI 0.316 0.556 0.198
Toledo city OH 0.259 0.558 0.224
San Antonio city TX 0.346 0.563 0.26546
Appendix 3, Table 1 (cont’d.)
Indianapolis city IN 0.349 0.571 0.254
Atlanta city GA 0.322 0.572 0.299
Erie city PA 0.211 0.576 0.136
Jacksonville city FL 0.310 0.577 0.231
Beaumont city TX 0.356 0.578 0.258
Macon city GA 0.280 0.583 0.235
Lawrence city MA 0.162 0.599 0.076
Kansas City city MO 0.363 0.601 0.210
Louisville city KY 0.406 0.611 0.228
Newark city NJ 0.327 0.637 0.112
Duluth city MN 0.221 0.642 0.133
Omaha city NE 0.336 0.644 0.187
Jersey City city NJ 0.295 0.645 0.112
Grand Rapids city MI 0.307 0.651 0.129
Evansville city IN 0.340 0.659 0.169
Allentown city PA 0.227 0.670 0.144
Lansing city MI 0.315 0.678 0.163
Syracuse city NY 0.291 0.686 0.132
St. Louis city MO 0.450 0.700 0.131
Utica city NY 0.361 0.707 0.123
Pittsburgh city PA 0.390 0.720 0.107
Dayton city OH 0.332 0.721 0.076
Cleveland city OH 0.383 0.736 0.057
Boston city MA 0.435 0.750 0.108
Akron city OH 0.454 0.767 0.130
Philadelphia city PA 0.503 0.773 0.098
South Bend city IN 0.430 0.791 0.101
Worcester city MA 0.376 0.804 0.070
Springfield city MA 0.471 0.829 0.072
Rochester city NY 0.495 0.834 0.060
Youngstown city OH 0.507 0.835 0.047
Buffalo city NY 0.549 0.840 0.079
Scranton city PA 0.445 0.845 0.042
Gary city IN 0.599 0.853 0.064
Flint city MI 0.651 0.905 0.057
Detroit city MI 0.822 0.937 0.02247














Oxnard city CA 0.000 0.005 0.989
Honolulu city HI 0.010 0.010 0.987
Anaheim city CA 0.010 0.010 0.987
New Haven city CT 0.000 0.011 0.989
San Diego city CA 0.007 0.016 0.958
Los Angeles city CA 0.011 0.020 0.958
Lowell city MA 0.000 0.020 0.931
Washington city DC 0.008 0.021 0.921
Bridgeport city CT 0.000 0.023 0.969
Lawrence city MA 0.015 0.030 0.962
Hartford city CT 0.017 0.034 0.881
San Francisco city CA 0.034 0.035 0.954
Vallejo city CA 0.027 0.036 0.920
Waterbury city CT 0.019 0.037 0.932
Reno city NV 0.000 0.038 0.880
Boston city MA 0.018 0.040 0.880
Riverside city CA 0.024 0.045 0.886
Seattle city WA 0.008 0.046 0.856
Albany city NY 0.037 0.046 0.889
Springfield city MA 0.011 0.059 0.855
Providence city RI 0.024 0.065 0.878
Ann Arbor city MI 0.031 0.069 0.779
Worcester city MA 0.019 0.077 0.812
Jersey City city NJ 0.034 0.079 0.910
New York city NY 0.039 0.079 0.857
Greensboro city NC 0.027 0.080 0.800
Miami city FL 0.033 0.110 0.756
Paterson city NJ 0.070 0.116 0.791
Fort Lauderdale city FL 0.027 0.117 0.680
Las Vegas city NV 0.014 0.121 0.603
Colorado Springs city CO 0.020 0.124 0.611
Nashville-Davidson city TN 0.040 0.128 0.685
Sacramento city CA 0.042 0.128 0.735
Denver city CO 0.022 0.129 0.659
Newark city NJ 0.079 0.145 0.789
New Orleans city LA 0.055 0.153 0.673
Lexington-Fayette city KY 0.049 0.156 0.611
Stockton city CA 0.066 0.159 0.713
Baton Rouge city LA 0.090 0.163 0.701
Bakersfield city CA 0.022 0.179 0.585
Austin city TX 0.055 0.184 0.63448
Appendix 3, Table 2 (cont’d.)
Winston-Salem city NC 0.028 0.197 0.631
Orlando city FL 0.057 0.199 0.521
Dallas city TX 0.084 0.206 0.644
Atlanta city GA 0.065 0.207 0.642
Tulsa city OK 0.096 0.263 0.547
Anchorage city AK 0.091 0.269 0.436
Corpus Christi city TX 0.100 0.282 0.419
Eugene city OR 0.102 0.284 0.503
Syracuse city NY 0.090 0.290 0.421
El Paso city TX 0.068 0.301 0.474
Memphis city TN 0.118 0.303 0.470
Rochester city NY 0.104 0.306 0.309
Fresno city CA 0.105 0.316 0.404
Jackson city MS 0.123 0.318 0.429
Fort Worth city TX 0.143 0.319 0.469
Tampa city FL 0.138 0.345 0.448
Shreveport city LA 0.187 0.356 0.479
Allentown city PA 0.094 0.363 0.316
Chicago city IL 0.137 0.364 0.414
San Antonio city TX 0.158 0.374 0.421
Oklahoma City city OK 0.181 0.375 0.427
Baltimore city MD 0.148 0.378 0.339
Mobile city AL 0.164 0.383 0.438
Houston city TX 0.202 0.406 0.418
Chattanooga city TN 0.164 0.431 0.352
Grand Rapids city MI 0.125 0.434 0.270
Minneapolis city MN 0.079 0.440 0.230
Lubbock city TX 0.158 0.457 0.310
Portland city OR 0.185 0.465 0.285
Louisville city KY 0.231 0.490 0.306
Jacksonville city FL 0.259 0.539 0.237
Fort Wayne city IN 0.262 0.554 0.187
Springfield city MO 0.255 0.563 0.221
Lorain city OH 0.216 0.581 0.186
Buffalo city NY 0.347 0.607 0.226
Philadelphia city PA 0.403 0.621 0.204
St. Louis city MO 0.314 0.630 0.142
Beaumont city TX 0.369 0.644 0.210
Peoria city IL 0.389 0.654 0.185
Kansas City city MO 0.453 0.667 0.187
Milwaukee city WI 0.256 0.677 0.096
Erie city PA 0.389 0.678 0.122
South Bend city IN 0.421 0.686 0.153
Spokane city WA 0.368 0.706 0.130
Des Moines city IA 0.296 0.718 0.086
Toledo city OH 0.435 0.719 0.147
Davenport city IA 0.299 0.735 0.14349
Appendix 3, Table 2 (cont’d.)
Pittsburgh city PA 0.468 0.793 0.119
Cleveland city OH 0.493 0.853 0.039
Gary city IN 0.696 0.901 0.033
Flint city MI 0.683 0.908 0.037
Detroit city MI 0.885 0.963 0.01850
Table 1:
Population Growth and the Share of Housing Below Construction Costs in 1990
Cities with
Abundant Cheap Housing
(50%+ of Single Family Housing
Below Construction Costs and
30%+ at Least 20% Below
Construction Costs)
Cities with Moderate Amounts
of Cheap Housing
(Between 25% and 50% of Single
Family Housing Below Construction
Costs and between 10% and 30% at
Least 20% Below Construction Costs)
Cities with Little Cheap Housing
(<25% of Single Family Housing
Below Construction Costs and
Less than 10% at Least 20%
Below Construction Costs)
# of Cities 15 20 45
# of Cities in Group with
Positive Population Growth 11 1 3 6
Mean Population Growth,
1980-1990 -9.3% 4.3% 10.8%
Median Population Growth,
1980-1990 -9.0% 2.6% 5.4%
Notes:
1.  Sample consists of 93 cities with sufficient micro housing data in the 1990 IPUMS and construction cost data from the R.S.
Means Company.  See Appendix 3 for the full list of cities.
2.  See Appendix 1 for the details for the calculation of house values relative to construction costs.51
Table 2:  The Skewness of Urban Growth and




















1.  Data are for sample of 114 cities with continuous population data from 1920-
2000.  Each city was the equivalent of a census-designated place in 1920 and had
a population of at least 10,000 in that year.
2.  Implied δ is the implied depreciation rate based on the formula in Proposition 1.
See the text for details.52
Table 3:  Summary Statistics on the Persistence of Growth,


















































1.49 4.98 5.50 4.07
Prob>F: 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.04
# of Observations 114 114 322 322
Notes:
1.  All cities had a population of at least 30,000 in the initial period pertaining to the
relevant regression analysis.
2.  The 114 city sample used to estimate the specifications reported in the first two
columns is drawn from the long time series on city population dating back to
1920.
3.  The 322 city sample used to estimate the specifications reported in the final two
columns are drawn from a shorter time series running from 1970-2000.
4.  Standard errors of coefficients are in parentheses.  A single * indicates
significance at the 10% level;  a double ** indicates significance at the 5% level.53
Table 4:  Price Changes and Population Changes































Adjusted R-square 0.07 0.42 0.07










1.  Data are drawn from large city sample dating to 1970.  All cities used had populations
of at least 30,000 in 1970.
2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Clustering occurs because of identical weather
data for some cities located within the same metropolitan area.  For the first four
specifications using the log change in median house price as the dependent variable,
data from 322 cities is used in the analysis, with 215 unique clusters observed in the
sample.   For the final two specifications using the log change in median rent as the
dependent variable, data from 284 cities is used in the analysis, with 204 unique clusters
observed in the sample.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** denotes significance at
the 5% level or better.54


















































1.  Data are drawn from the large city sample dating to 1970.  All cities had populations of at least
30,000 in 1970.
2.  Robust standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.  Clustering occurs because of
identical weather data for some cities located within the same metropolitan area.  For the first
two regressions using population changes in the 1990s, 203 unique clusters are observed.  For
the middle two regressions using population changes in the 1980s, 214 unique clusters are
observed.  For the final two regressions using population changes from the 1970s, 214 unique
clusters are observed.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** indicates significance at or better
than the 5% level.55



































# of observations 322 321 287












1.  Data are drawn from the large city sample dating to 1970.  All cities had populations of
at least 30,000 in 1970.
2.  Robust standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.  Clustering occurs because
of identical weather data from some cities located within the same metropolitan area.
For the first two regressions using house price changes in the 1980s, 214 unique clusters
are observed.  For the middle two regressions using house price changes in the 1970s,
214 unique clusters are observed.  For the final two regressions using rent changes in
the 1980s, 203 unique clusters are observed.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** denotes significance at
the 5% level.56
Table 7:  Population and Price Changes



























# of observations 322 322









1.  Data are drawn from large city sample dating to 1970.  All cities had populations of at
least 30,000 in 1970.
2.  Standard errors of the coefficients are reported in parentheses.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** denotes significance at
the 5% level.57
Table 8:  Home Prices, Construction Costs, and Future Growth
Dependent Variables




























































































Observations 123 123 93 93
R-squared 0.38 0.60 0.11 0.65
Notes:
1.  Sample of cities drawn from those with construction cost estimates
from the Means data.  All possible cities used.  All cities had
populations in excess of 30,000 as of 1970.
2.  Standard errors in parentheses.  No clustering of cities in the same
metropolitan area occurs in this sample.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** denotes
significance at the 5% level.58
Table 9: Human Capital and City Growth,
The Share of College Graduates in the 1970s and 1980s





















































































































































Observations 324 323 323 276 276 276
R-squared 0.03 0.28 0.46 0.02 0.23 0.33















1.  Data are drawn from large city sample dating to 1970.  All cities had populations in excess of 30,000 in 1970.
2.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  For the first three regressions using college share changes in the 1980s, 216
unique clusters are observed. For the final three regressions using college share changes in the 1970s, 199 unique clusters are
observed.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** denotes significance at the 5% level or better.59
Table 10: Human Capital and City Growth,
The Share of High School Dropouts in the 1970s and 1980s





















































































































































Observations 324 323 323 324 322 322
R-squared 0.10 0.62 0.62 0.03 0.43 0.45















1.  Data are drawn from large city sample dating to 1970.  All cities had populations in excess of 30,000 in 1970.
2.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  For the first three regressions using college share changes in the 1980s, 216
unique clusters are observed. For the final three regressions using college share changes in the 1970s, 215 unique clusters are
observed.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** denotes significance at the 5% level or better.60
Table 11: Human Capital and City Growth,
Real Income Growth in the 1970s and 1980s


























































































































































Observations 322 321 321 321 321 321
R-squared 0.22 0.49 0.76 0.28 0.43 0.68















1.  Data are drawn from large city sample dating to 1970.  All cities had populations in excess of 30,000 in 1970.
2.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  For the first three regressions using college share changes in the 1980s, 215
unique clusters are observed. For the final three regressions using college share changes in the 1970s, 215 unique clusters
also are observed.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** denotes significance at the 5% level.61
Table 12: Human Capital and City Growth,























































































































































Observations 324 321 321 323 320 320
R-squared 0.18 0.34 0.49 0.28 0.67 0.73















1.  Data are drawn from large city sample dating to 1970.  All cities had populations in excess of 30,000 in 1970.
2.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  For the first three regressions using college share changes in the 1980s, 215
unique clusters are observed. For the final three regressions using college share changes in the 1970s, 215 unique clusters
also are observed.
3.  A single * denotes significance at the 10% level;  a double ** denotes significance at the 5% level or better.62
























Figure 2:  Housing Units and Population Levels, 1990
Log Population, 1990









Olympia  Parkersb Jamestow
Wheeling Hagersto Florence Fort Pie








Ocala ci Fayettev York cit Middleto Elkhart  Lafayett
Bradento Augusta  Fort Mye
Lima cit Athens c Biloxi c
Vancouve Medford  Decatur  St. Clou Santa Cr Alexandr Johnson  Mansfiel
Sarasota
Altoona  Blooming Janesvil Bellingh
Harrisbu Binghamt Danville Battle C Dothan c Yakima c
Huntingt






Terre Ha Pensacol Greenvil
Galvesto
Anderson Melbourn




Las Cruc Champaig Killeen 
Portland
Danbury  Appleton Lynchbur Redding  Waterloo
West Pal
Utica ci
Columbia Saginaw  Lawrence
Longview
Lakeland
Lake Cha Rocheste Muncie c Lorain c
Wilmingt Pawtucke Fort Smi Fargo ci Tyler ci
Clarksvi Visalia 
Fayettev Joliet c Tuscaloo Albany c Norwalk  Reading  Kalamazo Kenosha  Charlest Sioux Ci Lawton c Billings Scranton Boulder  Decatur 
McAllen 
Canton c Racine c San Ange Gainesvi Duluth c Santa Ba
Provo ci
Fort Col Trenton 
Midland  Odessa c Fall Riv
Brockton






New Bedf Albany c
Lowell c
Waco cit Portsmou Allentow Springfi South Be Macon ci Abilene  Salem ci Stamford Escondid Erie cit Cedar Ra
Salinas 
Waterbur
Vallejo  Ann Arbo Elizabet




Tallahas Boise Ci Evansvil Lansing  New Have Pasadena
Pomona c








Kansas C Chattano Irving c
Springfi




Knoxvill Worceste Newport 
Fort Way
Bakersfi
Little R Tacoma c Spokane 
Columbus
Dayton c Greensbo Lubbock  Montgome
Hialeah 
Grand Ra Madison  Lincoln  Des Moin Mobile c Jackson  Shrevepo Richmond Raleigh 
Stockton




















Pittsbur Oakland  Albuquer
Virginia
Atlanta  Charlott
St. Loui Tucson c Long Bea
Kansas C Portland Oklahoma Fort Wor
Austin c Denver c Nashvill New Orle Clevelan
El Paso 
Seattle  Boston c Washingt
Memphis  Milwauke Columbus Jacksonv
San Fran Indianap Baltimor
San Jose
San Anto
Phoenix  Dallas c





























Figure 3:  Log Change in Housing Units and Population, 1970-1980
Log Change Popuation
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Figure 4: Distribution of Cities for Share Below Construction Costs
Percent Homes Below 100% of Construction Costs






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5:  Solow’s Linear City With A Single Amenity
(the central business district (CBD))
C67
Figure 6:  Short-Run and Long-Run Changes in City Size




























Figure 7:  City Population Growth Rates in 1980s
Log Population Change, 1980-1990












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: House Price Growth and Population Growth, 1980s
log change population
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Figure 9: Population Growth and Weather, 1980s
mean January temperature
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Figure 10: House Price Growth and Weather, 1980s
mean January temperature
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